Therefore, all the water is eventually released downstream with the effect that there is no net loss of water to downstream states. India dispatch: Supreme Court limits DNA paternity testing in divorce proceedings, prioritizing childrens privacy rights, US dispatch: Texas case could limit access to abortion medication, Copyright infringement made federal crime. In my opinion, this should be negotiable, to fill the lake over a longer period, and only when the river is sufficiently full. Location l Formerly called as project x then known as the Millennium Dam then it renamed to Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Attempts to resolve the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute over the past decade have reached a deadlock. July 26, 2022. Here, for the first time, Egypt recognised Ethiopias right to use the Nile for development purposes. Although talks chaired by President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa on behalf of the African Union have resolved many issues associated with the filling of the GERDs reservoir, there is still no agreement on the role that the dam will play in mitigating droughts. The Grand Renaissance Dam and prospects for cooperation on the Eastern Nile. The GERD has become a new reality challenging the traditional dynamics in the Nile River Basin. Although the case has been dropped, the organisations work focused international attention on the dams potential detrimental impacts on the lakes habitat. This is because it is traditionally understood to refer to waterways that form intrinsic parts of international boundaries. Gebreluel, G. (2014). This article quantifies the major benefits of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project for Sudan and Egypt based on GERDP technical design and quantitative analysis. (2011). The latter, in Article 2(4), allocated acquired rights of 66% of Nile water to Egypt and 22% to Sudan (with the remaining 12% attributed to leakage). Indeed, the ICJ confirmed in Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project that all riparian states have a basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of the watercourse. Moreover, these principles were pulled through into the DoP agreed by both Egypt and Ethiopia. Ethiopia announced in April 2011 that it intends to build four large dams on the Nile, including one of the largest in the world, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (formerly known as Project X or the Grand Millennium Dam).This huge dam will flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia, near the Sudan border, and create a reservoir that is nearly twice as large as Lake Tana . Ultimately, however, Egypt did not sign the CFA (nor did Sudan) hence it does not resolve the dispute. It imports about half its food products and recycles about 25 bcm of water annually. It is perhaps the most glaring demonstration of environmental or climate injustice that the youngest continent (60 percent of the population is below the age of twenty-five) is also the one that has historically least contributed to the industrial emissions of greenhouse gases yet is likely the one that will be hardest affected by meteorological l Coordinates 111255N 3505 . This exception was implemented to mitigate the risk of decolonisation leading to boundary wars. As mentioned above, Ethiopias dam-construction strategy is intimately linked with large-scale foreign investment in the agrarian sector and specifically in areas near the artificial reservoirs created by the dams. But this did not rule out eruptions of tension, not just between local communities and the central government, but also between Ethiopia and its neighbours. The Nile waters have historically been governed by the Nile Waters Treaties. These colonial-era agreements comprise (i) the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty (with the UK representing modern-day Sudan); (ii) the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (with the UK representing modern-day Kenya and Uganda) and (iii) the 1959 Egypt-Sudan Treaty (with the UK now absent as a result of decolonisation). What Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia must overcome to all benefit from the Grand Renaissance Dam. The Ethiopian government is spending $4.7 billion to construct the 1,780-meter dam across the Blue Nile. Perhaps the most significant project in the 2003 plan was the Chemoga-Yeda Hydroelectric Project, a series of five small dams on Blue Nile tributaries and two dams on the Genale River with a couple more envisioned for a later phase. Ethiopia's determination to build a major new dam, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), for hydropower purposes has been the flashpoint of current conflicts in the Eastern Nile Basin (Gebreluel, 2014). The 6,000-megawatt Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, shown here in May 2016, is scheduled to begin producing electricity in 2017. It signifies that Egypts de facto veto power on major upstream dams has been broken, and it clearly demonstrates the political will of Ethiopia to develop its water infrastructure even in the absence of a comprehensive basin agreement. We do know that Ethiopia is already seeing longer droughts and worse floods. This crisis has raised great concerns among large sectors of the Egyptian society, especially in light of recalling such statements as "water war," "water militarization," "military management of the GERD crisis," "water terrorism," and "Ethiopian hydro-hegemony over the Nile Basin" [ 1, 2 ]. Indeed, as Tekuya notes, Ethiopia persistently objected to the 1929 and 1959 treaties and made clear that its failure to exploit the Nile resulted from a lack of capacity rather than a lack of a legal right to do so. These conflicts could take the form of international armed conflicts (between states), non-international armed conflicts between a group and a state, or conflicts between non-state groups. Test. The 10-year filling time of GERD will likely contribute to fastened salinisation in Egypt. These countries should return to the NBIs Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which was concluded in 2010, try to resolve the disagreements that caused Egypt and Sudan to decline to sign the CFA, and use it as a model for a future binding legal regime. Such a mitigation program can make it much easier for Egyptian and Sudanese authorities to cooperate with Ethiopia and the other riparians in creating and adopting an agreement for management of the Nile. Also, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry later held the Egyptian side accountable for failure of these negotiations. Addis Ababa launched the construction of the GERD under Zenawi, and work on it has proceeded at full steam ahead ever since. In the end, all 11 riparian states must understand that the way forward calls for the establishment of a meaningful resource-sharing agreement, one that sees and recognizes the Nile River as a regional watercourse. 17th round of GERD tripartite talks hits wall in Cairo. The countrys 2003 development plan introduced many more, and the Ethiopian government launched an ambitious PR campaign to encourage donor nations and international funding agencies to support these projects financially and ideologically as the highway to Ethiopian development and prosperity. (2014). DISADVANTAGES OF ASWAN DAM the agriculture output of Egypt. Could the Nile dispute be an opportunity to boost freshwater technology? Feb 11th 2021 DAMS HAVE several uses. International rights organisations have reported that many cases of displacement were not voluntary and that entire communities were driven from their villages. This is because the VCLT allows an older treaty to be rescinded by a new one if the new one concerns the same topic (Article 59). In 1964, the US Land Reclamation Bureau conducted a study for the Ethiopian government, identifying 33 hydraulic projects in the Blue Nile Basin. A more recent trilateral meeting mediated by the African Union in mid-July, however, appeared to diffuse the situation with all three countries reaching a major common understanding towards achieving an agreement (Al Jazeera, 2020). You can revoke your consent to the site operator at any time by unsubscribing from the newsletter. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) constitutes a real crisis for the Egyptian regime, where Ethiopia several times blamed Egypt for the failure of negotiations conducted between Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia on the dam. Already, the United States has threatened to withhold development aid to Ethiopia if the conflict is not resolved and an agreement reached. What could have been strictly technical negotiations have turned into a political deadlock. Because the strategy of land allocation and dam construction relied on senior executive decisions and foreign funding from China, above all, the government was largely freed of pressures of transparency and accountability. But controversy has surrounded the project ever since it was announced in 2011 especially concerning its . The disadvantages for Egypt and Sudan are the possibility of reduced river flow, although this is only really a problem during the years of filling the dam. In contrast, other watercourse states on the Nile have lent their support to the Dam. Egypt has taken various efforts in a bid to secure its water security in the context of the Nile River. Consequently, it suits Egypts interests in this context to argue that the DoP is binding, that it precludes any net loss of flow and therefore that the use of the Dam for irrigation purposes is prohibited. Officials in Addis Ababa argue that the GERD will have no major impact on water flow into the Nile, instead arguing that the hydropower dam will provide benefits to countries in the region, including as a source of affordable electric power and as a major mechanism for the management of the Nile, including the mitigation of droughts and water salinity. However, it also entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed (see alsoSecurity implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt). For nearly a century, as a legacy of colonialism, Egypt enjoyed what Tekuya referred to as a hydro-hegemony over the Nile; despite Ethiopia contributing 86% to its waters. Egypt and Ethiopia have once again locked horns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. But the Ethiopian elites show little interest in addressing such concerns, bent as they are on a nationalist revivalist project that claims an Ethiopian exceptionalism that places Addis Ababa above international law as it pursues a water-management strategy that has less to do with its development aims than with its ambitions to weaponise water in a bid for regional hegemony. In terms of the old or anachronistic law, two of the Nile Water Treaties do not bind Ethiopia meanwhile the third does not actually preclude the construction of a dam. [35] The lack of international financing for projects on the Blue Nile River has persistently been attributed to Egypt's campaign to keep control on the Nile water share. The GERD has the potential to act both as driver for conflict, but also for cooperation. However, the Convention took almost twenty years to enter into force (from 1997 to 2014) due to the lack of necessary ratifications by states. It has also expressed concerns about the potential impact the initial filling of the dam will have on areas downstream. Addis Ababa has said the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a $4bn hydropower project, is crucial to its economic development and to provide power. The disadvantages for Egypt and Sudan are the possibility of reduced river flow, although this is only really a problem during the years of filling the dam. A series of talks since then have largely failed to produce a consensus among the concerned countries, with tensions rising again after Ethiopia announced its intention to begin filling the dam in July 2020. In March 2015, a 'Declaration of Principles' was signed by the leaders of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, setting the foundations for an initial cooperation (Salman, 2017). Afraid that a drought might appear during the filling period, Egypt wants the filling to take place over a much longer period. It seeks to build an infrastructure for regional water hegemony, positioning it, at the very least, in such a way that it can exchange water for oil. The other riparian states can then be brought in, either through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) or some other regional framework, to secure an agreement that is binding on all the states. (eds.). The so-called Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd) is Africa's biggest hydroelectric project to date. On March 4, 1909, the Copyright Act of 1909 became law, making infringement of a copyright a federal crime for the first time. As stipulated by an Agreement of 1959 (see:Nile Main Conflict), Egypt and Sudan presented for several decades a common position vis--vis other riparians regarding the utilisation and management of Nile waters. "I came to Cairo on my first official trip to the region to hear . Ethiopia could argue that those imperial powers did not foresee the decolonisation of Africa and that this represented a watershed event that profoundly changed the foundation on which the Nile Water Treaties were constructed. The New Arab (2020b). (2017). Furthermore, resolving conflicts involving the Nile River is most likely to be more successful through improvements in relations between the riparians and not through external intervention. On March 4, 1834, the town of York in the British colony of Canada was incorporated as the City of Toronto. This is an intergovernmental partnership to provide a forum for consultation and coordination for the sustainable management and development of shared water. Despite several tripartite meetings between November 2013 and January 2014, no agreement was reached on the implementation of the IPoE recommendations and controversies were evolving around the constitution of a trilateral committee. 2011. how much does the reservoir contain? Although Ethiopia has argued that the hydroelectric GERD will not significantly affect the flow of water into the Nile, Egypt, which depends almost entirely on the Nile waters for household and commercial uses, sees the dam as a major threat to its water security. If the relevant parties can agree to these goals, the agreement, in the end, will need to include technical language that ensures equitable sharing of the Nile. Four of these would potentially be located on the main river and one would eventually evolve into the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). [35] This is a matter of acute concern given that Egypt depends on the Nile for about 97% of its irrigation and drinking water. In July of 2021, the second filling of the dam was completed. If Egyptian authorities refuse to abandon these anachronistic treatieswhich have created untenable water-use rights that benefit only itself and Sudanall parties will remain at an impasse. Learn. Sudan is caught between the competing interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. Download PDF 1.40 MB. As they consider this controversial issue, all 11 riparian countries should seek to improve relations among themselves beyond their relationship with the Nile, especially in mutually beneficial areas such as trade; educational and cultural exchanges; the management of natural resources, including water; dealing with threats to peace and security, including the suppression and prevention of terrorism and extremism; and confronting major challenges to economic growth and poverty alleviation, such as climate change, widespread illiteracy, and poor infrastructure. for seepage and evaporation, but afforded no water to Ethiopia or other upstream riparian statesthe sources of most of the water that flows into the Nile. As noted above, the instrument concedes for the first time that Ethiopia has legitimate interests over the Nile. Still, if the exception was somehow activated, it would mean that Egypt remains entitled to 66% of the Nile River waters and that this figure should be used as the baseline for any future negotiations. Cooperation among the three countries has never been more important as demand for water rises, she added, due to factors such as population growth, urbanization and industrialization. This agreement could pave the way for a more detailed cooperation framework, and represents a major step toward dispute resolution. At that point, the lake that . In terms of putative new law, namely the Watercourses Convention and the DoP, the key principles of equitable utilisation and no significant harm seem to leave ample room to accommodate the construction of a dam for hydroelectric generation purposes. The Eastern Nile Basin is of critical geopolitical importance to the Niles overall hydro-political regime. Already, on June 19, 2020, Egyptian authorities called upon the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to intervene after tripartite talks had failed to secure an agreement on the filling schedule for the GERD. Another difficulty for Egypt is that making this argument (i.e. Churning waters: Strategic shifts in the Nile basin. One question that keeps coming up is: Will Ethiopia be willing to release enough water from the reservoir to help mitigate a drought downstream? Egyptian players abroad: Mostafa Mohamed's Nantes defeated at PSG, Trezeguet.. Italy Serie A results & fixtures (25th matchday), Egypts Prosecution investigates Hoggpool, Six European nations express concern over growing violence in Palestinian territories, Egyptian Premier League fixtures (21st matchday), US official says Biden expected to tighten rules on US investment in China. Further, it means that this figure should be used to assess the impact of the Dam on the Egyptian economy for the purposes of calculating compensation resulting from loss of flow. Search for jobs related to Disadvantages of the grand ethiopian renaissance dam or hire on the world's largest freelancing marketplace with 20m+ jobs. An optimistic trend among todays African commentators focuses primarily on economic growth rates and pays little attention to human tolls, questions of transparency and accountability, and the sustainability of growth. Egypt has issued a public statement to that effect. l located on the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia . Ethiopias interests in developing its water resources are driven by its growing population and high demand for socio-economic development (Gebreluel, 2014). Both Egypt and Ethiopia could make arguments in support of their positions. This dam, set to be the largest in Africa in terms of power capacity, continues to cause disagreement between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt on filling and operation strategies. The principles of cooperation have not been translated into specific technical agreements on dam management (and more), in the context of difficult domestic politics for both sides. Sudan, caught between the competing interests of both Egypt and Ethiopia, has been changing its stance on the issue. Mainly, for the downstream countries, the. It could be a treaty or merely a political declaration as the name implies. 67K views 6 months ago ETIOPIA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, is located around 14 km upstream of the Ethiopian-Sudan Border, at around 700 km from the Capital. Security implications of growing water scarcity in Egypt. Despite the intense disagreements, though, Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelectric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly. The unilateral decision taken by Ethiopia - which never recognised the 1959 agreement but had previously not been able to challenge it in fact - to build the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011 represents a major political challenge to the 1959 Agreement. In response, Ethiopia threatened military force to defend the dam and protect its interests (The New Arab, 2020a). It has led a diplomatic initiative to undermine support for the dam in the region; as well as in other countries supporting the project such as China and Italy. The situation seemed to improve in the beginning of 2015 when tripartite negotiations were held in order to determine principles of cooperation. However, as a result of the ability and willingness of Ethiopians at home and abroad to invest in the dam project, the government was able to raise a significant portion of the money needed to start the construction of the GERD. Ethiopia, however, prefers to have the flexibility to make decisions on how to deal with droughts. These run from rising rivalry between Egypt and Ethiopia to a festering border war between Ethiopia and neighboring Sudan. The strategy and its surrounding narrative have attracted large influxes of foreign investment in the Ethiopian agrarian sector, with multi-million dollar leases of agricultural land to foreigners generally linked to irrigation projects planned in tandem with the construction of the dam. Although Egypt and Sudan are likely to resist efforts to include the other upstream riparians in the negotiations or to allow a regional organization, such as the NBI, to serve as an implementing organ, they must understand that the Nile River is a regional watercourse and its management must be approached from a regional perspective.
Sprouts Distribution Center Aurora, Co, Accident In Halifax County, Va Today, Randleman High School Football Schedule, Articles D